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Although much work has recently been directed at understanding social decision-making,
relatively little is known about how different types of feedback impact adaptive changes
in social behavior. To address this issue quantitatively, we designed a novel associative
learning task called the “Tipping Game,” in which participants had to learn a social norm
of tipping in restaurants. Participants were found to make more generous decisions
from feedback in the form of facial expressions, in comparison to feedback in the
form of symbols such as ticks and crosses. Furthermore, more participants displayed
learning in the condition where they received social feedback than participants in the non-
social condition. Modeling results showed that the pattern of performance displayed by
participants receiving social feedback could be explained by a lower sensitivity to economic
costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Several behavioral, neurobiological and theoretical studies have
shown that social norm compliance, and more generally adap-
tive changes in social behavior, often require the effective use and
weighing of different types of information, including expected
economic costs and beneﬁts, the potential impact of our behavior
on the welfare of others and our own reputation, as well as feed-
back information (Bicchieri, 2006; Adolphs, 2009; Frith and Frith,
2012). Relatively little attention has been paid to how different
types of feedback (or reward) may impact the way social norms
are learned. The present study addresses this issue with behavioral
and modeling results from a novel associative learning task called
the “Tipping Game.”We take the example of tipping and ask: how
do social feedback in the form of facial expressions, as opposed
to non-social feedback in the form of such conventional signs as
ticks and crosses, affect the way participants learn a social norm
of tipping?
Recent ﬁndings indicate that people’s decision-making is often
biased by social stimuli. For example, images of a pair of eyes can
signiﬁcantly increase pro-social behavior in laboratory conditions
as well as in real-world contexts (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson
et al., 2006; Rigdon et al., 2009; Ernest-Jones et al., 2011). Fur-
thermore, decision-making can be systematically biased by facial
emotional expressions used as predictors of monetary reward
(Averbeck and Duchaine, 2009; Evans et al., 2011; Shore and
Heerey, 2011). Facial expressions of happiness elicit approach-
ing behavior, whereas angry faces elicit avoidance (Seidel et al.,
2010; for a review see Blair, 2003). Because they can function as
signals to others, eliciting speciﬁc behavioral responses, emotional
facial expressions play a major role in socialization practices that
help individuals to adapt to the norms and values of their culture
(Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Frith, 2009).
Despite this body of ﬁndings, the literature does not pro-
vide an unambiguous answer to the question of how learning
performance is affected by social stimuli in comparison to differ-
ent types of non-social stimuli used as feedback about previous
decisions in a learning task (Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Consistent
with the view that social reinforcement is a powerful facili-
tator of human learning (Zajonc, 1965; Bandura, 1977), one
recent study using a feedback-guided item-category association
task found that learning performance in control groups was
improved when social (smiling or angry faces) instead of non-
social (green or red lights) reinforcement was used (Hurlemann
et al., 2010).
However, the paradigm used in this study did not distin-
guish between two conditions in which social-facilitative effects
on learning performance have been observed: ﬁrst, a condition
characterized by the mere presence of others (Allport, 1920); and
second, a condition where others provide reinforcing feedback
(Zajonc, 1965). In the task used by Hurlemann et al. (2010), faces
were present onscreen throughout each trial, changing from a
neutral to a happy expression for correct responses or angry for
incorrect responses. So, this study could not identify the speciﬁc
effect of social feedback on learning.
Consistent with the assumption oft made in economics and
psychology that optimal decisions and learning are based on an
assessment of the evidence that is unbiased by the social or non-
social nature of the evidence itself (Becker, 1976; Oaksford and
Chater, 2007), Lin et al. (2012a) found that, instead of boosting
learning performance, social reward (smiling or angry faces) made
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learning slower, and generally less effective, in comparison to non-
social reward such as money.
It should be noted that Hurlemann et al. (2010) and Lin et al.
(2012a) were examining fundamentally different questions, which
may explain the difference in their results. In Hurlemann et al.’s
(2010) study, participants used feedback to learn the category
membership of an abstract string of numbers, whereas in Lin
et al.’s (2012a) study participants played an instrumental learning
task where they had to learn to select the slot machine associ-
ated with the highest probability of a positive valenced outcome.
So, depending on the task, social stimuli may have different,
sometimes opposite, effects on learning performance.
In particular, it remains controversial whether participants in
an associative learning task receiving feedback in the form of facial
expressions learn a social norm more effectively than participants
who are provided with non-social, cognitive feedback.
Our study contributes to previous literature by examiningmore
closely the relative impact of social (happy and angry faces) and
non-social feedback (tick and cross marks) on learning, and by
testing the hypothesis that social feedback leads to more generous
behavior, in the context of theTippingGame. This task tapped into
a basic mechanism underlying the ontogeny of social cognition
(Reeb-Sutherland et al., 2012), while allowing us to examine the
effects of social, as opposed to non-social, feedback on learning
and decision-making.
The Tipping Game shares several features with other reinforce-
ment learning tasks, and so the associated modeling framework
can be used to quantitatively characterize the behavioral results of
both healthy young people—as in our study—as well as clinical
and neurological patients (Lin et al., 2012b). In the present study,
modeling results helped to disentangle how information carried
by speciﬁc types of feedback stimuli may interact with economic
interest when people are learning a social norm. The originality
of the Tipping Game is the social context and social feedback that
it involves. These contribute to the higher ecological validity and
naturalness of our task, which distinguish it from the ones pre-
viously used in studies using facial expressions as predictors of
monetary reward (e.g., Averbeck and Duchaine, 2009; Hurlemann
et al., 2010; on the importance of the ecological validity in these
types of tasks, see Lin et al., 2012b, p. 7).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
Forty participants (23males)made decisions in theTippingGame.
The participants were students in the University of Edinburgh,
signed informed consent approved by the University of Edin-
burgh Ethics Committee, and were compensated with £6/h for
taking part in the experiment. While some of the participants
were international students, they all lived in the UK for 1 year or
more.
Design and procedure
The Tipping Game was implemented in Matlab, using the Psy-
chophysics Toolbox 3 extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007), andwas runon computers in sound-deadened
booths.
Initially, participants ﬁlled out ﬁve questionnaires: the “Empa-
thy Quotient” (EQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen and Wheel-
wright, 2004), one version of the “Reading the Mind in the
Eyes” test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), the “Self Report Altru-
ism” questionnaire (Rushton et al., 1981), the “Sensitivity to
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire” (SPSRQ;
Torrubia et al., 2001), and the “Behavioral Inhibition/Approach”
(BIS/BAS) questionnaire (Carver and White, 1994). These ques-
tionnaires measured respectively the level of empathy, mental-
izing, altruism, and punishment and reward sensitivity of the
participants.
After the questionnaires were completed, instructions were
given about the Tipping Game and its goals. Participants were
informed that they would take part in a computer-based task
where they had to imagine to be diners at restaurants in some
unfamiliar country. In each trial of the task, they would be pre-
sented ﬁrstly with information regarding the quality of the service
received at a restaurant (i.e., either good or bad service). Then,
the bill to be paid would be disclosed. Finally, participants should
decide which amount to tip in that restaurant taking into account
the quality of the service. After each decision, either positive
or negative feedback would be revealed, indicating that the tip
was either higher or lower than expected. Whether positive or
negative feedback was revealed depended stochastically on the
underlying social norm and on the pair service quality – amount
tipped (see Table 1). Feedback information received after a deci-
sion could be used by participants to learn how much they were
expected to tip.
The task consisted of three blocks, each one of which comprised
forty trials. A trial corresponded to one tipping interaction of the
sort just described. At the beginning of each block, participants
were endowed with 1,100 monetary units (mu), with which they
had to pay for restaurant bills and any tip they decided to give.
It was made explicit to the participants that the mu they were
using were ﬁctional, and that no actual person would beneﬁt from
their tips. All participants knew that their goal was to learn a
social norm of tipping so as to display adaptive behavior in the
social situation they were facing, while saving as much mu as
possible.
To motivate participants to pursue this goal, they were told
at the beginning of the task that the best overall performance
would be rewarded with £20, and that their overall performance
would be measured as a function of both how well the social norm
was learned and how much mu was saved across the whole task.
Table 1 | Feedback structure in Experiment 1.
Probability of positive
feedback
(tip < norm/tip ≥ norm)
Block 1
(norm 23%)
Block 2
(norm 50%)
Block 3
(norm 23%)
Good service 20/80 20/80 35/65
Bad service 30/70 30/70 40/60
Probability of obtaining a positive feedback as a function of the action that was
made (tip < norm/tip ≥ norm), and in the situation where the service was good
(ﬁrst line) or bad (second line).
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Participants were also informed that some manipulation could
take place across blocks so that they should treat each block as a
novel kind of situation (i.e., a different unfamiliar country).
Two types of manipulations took place. First, the underlying
social norm of tipping changed between blocks. Second, the relia-
bility of the reward feedback changed across blocks, with feedback
being more random in the third block than in the previous blocks
(Table 1).
In one condition (Social Condition), 20 participants (seven
females) received feedback in the form of a happy or an angry face.
Pictures of facial expressions were in greyscale and selected from
the Japanese Female Facial Expression (JAFFE) database (Lyons
et al., 1998). In a second condition (non-social condition), 20 par-
ticipants (10 females) received non-social feedback in the form of
a tick (also known as a check mark) or an X mark in greyscale.
Participants ﬁlled out a debrieﬁng questionnaire after they
completed the task.
Results and discussion
All data analyses in this and the following experiments were per-
formed off-line using commercial software packages SPSS 22 (IBM
Corp., 2013) and MATLAB 8.1 (MathWorks Inc., 2013).
The results of the personality questionnaire showed that all
participants displayed normal capacity for recognition of facial
expressions. On average, they also presented normal levels of
altruism, empathy and attitudes toward reward and punishment
(Table 2).
Results from the debrieﬁng questionnaires indicated that all
participants recognized the symbols used in the non-social condi-
tion as the notation respectively for positive and negative feedback.
One participant reported not having understood the task so his
data was excluded from further analysis.
Changes in tipping behavior for the two conditions during
the task were tested using the multiple analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA) procedure, with tipping percentages in each block
(three blocks) as dependent variables, group (two groups) as a
between subjects factor, and trial number (1–40) as a covariate.
The analysis was run on data concerning the decisions of 39 partic-
ipants (20 and 19 participants for social and non-social conditions
respectively) in the two groups.
Social feedback was found to have a different impact on tipping
and learning than non-social reward. Speciﬁcally, social feedback
was found to have a signiﬁcant effect on the percentages tipped in
blocks 2 and 3 (Table 3). Furthermore, considering the whole task,
the difference between the social norm and the amount tipped by
participants in the social condition was signiﬁcantly lower than
the difference between the social norm and the amount tipped
by participants in the non-social condition, i.e., the social group
tipped more by 1, 4.9 and 8.2% in blocks 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding conﬁrms the hypothesis that social feedback in
the form of facial expressions led participants to display higher
degree of generosity, viz. tipping contribution. The second ﬁnding
conﬁrms that learning is facilitated by social feedback.
A large inter-individual variability of performance was
observed, with some participants learning to adapt their decisions
to conform to the norm much better than other participants, who
seemed to behave independently of the feedback throughout the
experiment. Nonetheless, more participants displayed learning in
the social condition than participants in the non-social condition.
To quantify this, and identify the number of learners in the task, we
assumed that if the mean amount tipped by a participant was sig-
niﬁcantly different from one block to the next and moved toward
the underlying social norm, then that participant displayed learn-
ing. According to this criterion, we found that 12/20 displayed
learning in the social group, vs. 7/19 in the non-social group.
With respect to the scores of the personality questionnaires
we administered, no signiﬁcant difference between groups was
found (see Table 2). This ﬁnding mitigates the concern that
the behavioral effects observed could be explained solely by
some stable personality trait—for instance, by some autistic
trait.
Two further points should be noted. First, although the dif-
ference between the social norm and the amount tipped by
participants in the social condition was signiﬁcantly lower than
that for participants in the non-social condition, participants in
both groups always tipped less than the norm in the ﬁrst two
blocks. One hypothesis that could explain this ﬁnding is that par-
ticipants had a strong prior bias toward a speciﬁc action different
from the social norms in our task. Based on questionnaire results,
it is plausible that participants, who all lived in the UK for 1 year
or more, came to the Tipping Game with a prior of 13%, which
would be consistent with the behavior they displayed throughout
the experiment. Second, standard deviations from average per-
centages tipped in both groups were high, especially in the third
block (see Figure 1). Considering the whole experiment, the stan-
dard deviation from the average percentage tipped by the social
Table 2 | Personality questionnaires average scores for social (Soc.) and non-social (Non-Soc.) groups.
Faces Altruism Drive FS RR BI EQ SR SP
Soc. 17.9 (1.98) 55.3 (10.32) 10.3 (1.62) 11.9 (3.00) 15.7 (2.38) 21.3 (3.49) 39.0 (14.97) 10.9 (3.91) 11.4 (5.36)
Non-Soc. 18.2 (1.09) 56.1 (9.01) 10.9 (1.92) 11.6 (2.08) 17.5 (2.14) 21.4 (2.85) 45.7 (7.92) 9.9 (3.71) 10.2 (4.35)
p-value 0.548 0.796 0.263 0.796 0.019 0.866 0.092 0.417 0.454
Table entries indicate average scores and standard deviations (in brackets) for “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” (Faces), “Self Report Altruism,” “Behavioral Inhibi-
tion/Approach” questionnaire’s fun seeking (FS), reward responsiveness (RR), behavioral inhibition (BI) components, “Empathy Quotient” (EQ), and “Sensitivity to
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire’s” sensitivity to reward (SR) and sensitivity to punishment (SP) components. One-way ANOVA p-values are
reported in the last row. Even though reward responsiveness was signiﬁcantly higher in the non-social group, such a difference between groups would only diminish
the effect size.
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Table 3 | Multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) results for Experiment 1.
Source Dependent variable Grand mean (%) Standard deviation (%) DoF F Significance η2p
Group (IV) Block 1 14.8 12.3 1 2.526 0.112 0.002
Block 2 22.9 21.9 1 20.530 0 0.013
Block 3 23.3 68.1 1 5.653 0.018 0.004
Error Block 1 1557
Block 2 1557
Block 3 1557
Testing was performed on the effects of the independent variable (IV) Group (i.e., the type of feedback received by participants) on the percentage of the bill tipped
by participants. The mean tipping percentage (i.e., percentage of the bill tipped) and standard deviation for each block is presented with corresponding degrees of
freedom (DoF), F statistics, signiﬁcance (p-value), and effect size (η2p).
FIGURE 1 | (A) Structure of a single trial. First, state of service is
presented (either good or bad). Then, the participant is presented with a
bill drawn from a normal distribution with μ = 18, σ = 5 (truncated to be
>3 and <45). A decision is made, and the participant is presented with
either positive or negative feedback (with a certain probability; see
Tables 1 and 4 for details) represented as a face or a tick/cross for social
and non-social conditions respectively. The task was implemented using
the Matlab Psychophysics Toolbox extensions. (B) Faces used as social
feedback cues (Lyons et al., 1998). (C) Group averaged tipping
performances in Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 (bottom). Shaded
areas are ±standard deviation; the dashed line is the social norm of
tipping.
groupwas 5.64 vs. 3.39mu for the non-social group. So, in general,
we observed high variability in the behavioral data; in particular,
participants in the social group took actions that were spread out
over a larger range of values in comparison to the actions taken by
participants in the non-social group.
EXPERIMENT 2
Results from Experiment 1 raised two questions. First, does social
feedback impact both learning performance and willingness to
be generous to the same degree, or rather one of these two
factors more than the other? Experiment 1 could not answer
this question because the norms of tipping to be learned were
above standard real-life levels (i.e., around 15%). So, learning
performance aligned with generosity. If social feedback boosts
generosity more than learning, then it will lead to a resistance
toward learning a new norm when this norm is lower than the
standard; that is, learning performance will be biased toward
over-tipping.
Second, does social feedback impact learning performance only
when the difﬁculty of the task is higher? Results fromExperiment 1
could be explained simply as a function of the difﬁculty of the task,
namely: themore unreliable was the feedback, themore signiﬁcant
was the difference we found between social and non-social group.
If social feedback is effective only when the task is difﬁcult, then
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no signiﬁcant difference will be found between groups when the
feedback provided is more reliable. Experiment 2 was designed to
test these two predictions.
METHODS
Participants
A novel sample of forty participants (12 males) made decisions in
the Tipping Game. All participants were students in the University
of Edinburgh, signed informed consent approvedby theUniversity
of Edinburgh Ethics Committee and were compensated with £6/h
for taking part in the experiment. While some of the participants
were international students, they all lived in the UK for 1 year or
more.
Design and procedure
This second experiment was different from Experiment 1 in three
respects. To test our ﬁrst prediction, the social norm of tipping in
the secondblockwas lower than the standard: itwas 7%. To test our
second prediction,we added a fourth block, where the reliability of
the feedbackwas higher (see Table 4). Including a fourth block, the
task in this second experimentwas longer than inExperiment 1. So,
in order to prevent participants from getting excessively bored or
fatigued, we decided not to administer personality questionnaires.
Results and discussion
Results from the debrieﬁng questionnaires indicated that all par-
ticipants recognized the symbols used in the non-social condition
as the notation respectively for positive and negative feedback.
Changes in tipping behavior for the two conditions during the
task were tested using the MANCOVA procedure, with tipping
percentages in each block (four blocks) as dependent variables,
group (two groups) as a between subjects factor, and trial number
(1–40) as a covariate. The analysis was run on data concerning the
decisions of 40 in the two groups.
Social feedback was found to have a different impact on
learning and social decision-making than non-social feedback,
thus conﬁrming the results of Experiment 1. Speciﬁcally, social
feedback cues were found to have a signiﬁcant effect on per-
centages tipped in all blocks (see Table 5). Furthermore, the
difference between the social norm and the amount tipped
by participants in the social condition was signiﬁcantly lower
than the difference between the social norm and the amount
tipped by participants in the non-social condition, i.e., social
group tipped more by 7.2, 1.8, 2.9 and 10.6% in blocks 1 to 4
respectively.
So, as the percentages tipped by the social group were found
to be higher than those of the non-social group across all blocks,
the hypothesis receives some conﬁrmation that social feedback in
the form of facial expressions led participants to display higher
degrees of generosity. As in experiment 1, the second differ-
ence we found indicates that social cues may facilitate learning
of a social norm. Although in block 2 the social group did not
learn the norm better than the non-social group, which suggests
that the learning effect observed in all other conditions might be
driven by generosity, more participants displayed learning in the
social condition than in the non-social condition. According to
Table 4 | Feedback structure in Experiment 2.
Probability of positive feedback
(tip < norm/tip ≥ norm)
Block 1 (norm 23%) Block 2 (norm 7%) Block 3 (norm 23%) Block 4 (norm 50%)
Good state 20/80 20/80 35/65 5/95
Bad state 30/70 30/70 40/60 10/90
Probability of obtaining a positive feedback as a function of the action that was made (tip < norm/tip ≥ norm), and in the situation where the service was either good
(ﬁrst line) or bad (second line).
Table 5 | Multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) results for Experiment 2.
Source Dependent variable Grand mean Standard deviation DoF F Significance η2p
Group (IV) Block 1 19.8% 16.8% 1 77.006 0 0.046
Block 2 17.9% 12.6% 1 8.106 0.004 0.005
Block 3 21.9% 17.6% 1 10.810 0.001 0.007
Block 4 31.2% 20.7% 1 117.125 0.000 0.068
Error Block 1 1597
Block 2 1597
Block 3 1597
Block 4 1597
Testing was performed on the effects of the independent variable (IV) Group (i.e., the type of feedback received by participants) on the percentage of the bill tipped
by participants. The mean tipping percentage (i.e., percentage of the bill tipped) and standard deviation for each block is presented with corresponding degrees of
freedom (DoF), F statistics, signiﬁcance (p-value), and effect size (η2p). Signiﬁcant differences between percentages tipped by each group were observed in all blocks.
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the learning criterion described above, we found that 17/20 dis-
played learning in the social group, vs. 10/20 in the non-social
group.
A MODEL OF THE TIPPING GAME
To further describe quantitatively the nature of the effects that
we observed, we used a Rescorla–Wagner reinforcement learning
algorithm (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) to model the behavior of
participants in our two experiments. The model algorithm makes
decisions in our task with the goal of maximizing its total reward.
It does this by learning action values Q for state-action pairs, and
selecting actions in function of their estimated Q-values at each
trial.
The possible states were two, corresponding to “good” or “bad”
service quality. The action space comprised 101 actions, corre-
sponding to tip percentages from 0% increasing in steps of 1 to
100%. For each of the two states, the action taken by the model
was iteratively assigned a value Q, which was a function of the
reward obtained for taking that action (a combination of feedback
received and economic cost incurred, see below) and the Q-value
of that state-action pair stored in memory. This is expressed by the
Q-update equation:
Q(state, action)new = Q(state, action)old +
α(reward − Q(state, action)old) (1)
where α is the learning rate (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). The smaller α, the
less the existing knowledge is modiﬁed. Conversely, as α tends
to 1, what has already been learned can be quickly overwritten.
The reward signal in our model consisted of the hyperbolic tan-
gent (scaling to interval [−1 1]) of the weighted difference of
two components: an economic component and a reward outcome
component. Formally:
Reward = tanh(wout rout − weconrecon) (2)
where recon is an economic factor that is equal to the Tip/Bill ratio.
As we assumed that the model could tip at most an amount equal
to the bill, the range of this economic factor is 0 ≤ recon ≤ 1.
The economic weight wecon is a parameter that determines the
extent to which spending money in tips was valued in the Tip-
ping Game. We assumed that, at best, spending money in tips
would not have any negative impact on an agent’s reward signal,
and we set the range of this parameter to 0 ≤ wecon ≤ wmax,
where wmax is 10. So, lower values of wecon indicate that the agent
does not mind spending money in tips. Conversely, higher val-
ues of wecon indicate that the agent does mind spending money
in tips. If the agent does not mind spending money in tips at all
(viz., wecon = 0), then the economic cost of a tip, whatever its
amount, will not weigh against the agent’s overall reward. So, if
the agent displays wecon = 0, then it will systematically over-tip in
the Tipping Game. Roughly, lower values of wecon correspond to a
more nonchalant attitude toward tipping—whatever the amount.
The reward outcome factor rout is associated to the two possible
outcomes in the task: either positive feedback or negative feed-
back. The reward magnitude of positive feedback is assumed to
be 1, while the magnitude of negative feedback is assumed to be
0. The outcome weight wout (0 ≤ wout ≤ wmax) is a parame-
ter that determines to what extent positive feedback was valued.
Higher values of wout correspond to a more positive feedback-
seeking attitude. When wecon > wout, it should be expected that
the agent will severely under-tip in the Tipping Game. When
wecon < wout, the learning behavior of the agent in the Tipping
Game will depend heavily on the action selection mechanism,
in particular on how the exploration of the action space is
performed.
Finally, the model made choices according to the “softmax”
rule:
p(action|state) = exp(τQ(state, action))
N∑
i=1
exp(τQ(state, actioni))
(3)
which determines the probability of selecting a certain action (e.g.,
a tip of 11% of the bill) for a given state (e.g., “good” service). The
parameter τ featuring in (3) is positive and is called “inverse tem-
perature.”A low τ causes the actions to be all nearly equiprobable;
whereas, as τ gets larger, the action with the highest expected
reward has a much higher probability of being selected than the
other actions.
MODELING RESULTS
To estimate parameters values, we ﬁtted the model to each partic-
ipant using maximum likelihood, resulting in a set of parameters
(i.e., α, τ, wout and wecon) that maximized the probability that the
model-agent would make the same choices as the participant (on
average over the course of the experiment).
The parameter values obtained conﬁrmed that participants in
the social group displayed different learning and decision-making
proﬁles from participants in the non-social group. For the two
experiments, a large difference between the social and non-social
group was found in the economic weight wecon: in comparison to
participants in the non-social condition, participants in the social
condition were much less sensitive to economic costs, thereby
displaying a more generous tipping behavior (Table 6). This dif-
ference is partly explained by the number of learners in each
group. Smaller, but non-zero, values of wecon were characteristic
of participants who displayed a better learning performance, and,
according to the learning criterion we employed (see Results and
Discussion), the number of learners in the social group was larger
than the number of learners in the non-social group. So, it should
be expected that the larger the difference in the number of learners
Table 6 | Average model parameters for the two experiments.
Group α T wout w econ
Experiment 1 Social 0.24 93.2 4.43 0.004
Non-social 0.2 78.8 3.82 0.038
Experiment 2 Social 0.4 20.7 5.68 0.002
Non-social 0.29 59.9 4.51 0.081
Signiﬁcant differences (p = 0.019 and p = 0.049 in Experiments 1 and 2 respec-
tively; independent two-tailed t-tests) were found in economic weight values
between the groups (wecon).
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between the two groups, the larger is the difference between the
economic weights wecon that characterize the two group’s tipping
behavior.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our study asked how the type of feedback obtained by people after
they make decisions in social situations affect the way they learn a
social norm. We addressed this question by determining whether
the inﬂuence of facial expressions on participants’ decisions in
a novel associative learning task called the “Tipping Game” was
signiﬁcantly different from the inﬂuence of non-social feedback
in the form of conventional marks. We found that participants
receiving feedback in the form of happy or angry facial expres-
sions behaved in a signiﬁcantly different way than participants
receiving feedback in the form of tick or cross marks. This effect
was observed across most blocks in our task, and, speciﬁcally, had
impact on how much participants were willing to give as a tip
and on how well they learned the underlying social norm. We
must however note that the observed effect sizes were small (cf.,
Tables 3 and 5).
In order to explore quantitatively our participants’ behavior,
we used a version of the Rescorla–Wagner algorithm to model
performance in the Tipping Game. Modeling results show that
differences in the attitude toward economic costs, captured by
wecon, could account for the behavioral differences much better
than differences in outcome weights, rate of learning or action
selection strategy.
Taken together, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the potent role of social
reinforcements on learning, which is predicted by classical social
learning and facilitation theories (Zajonc, 1965; Bandura, 1977;
see also Doris and Nichols, 2012). Consistent with previous ﬁnd-
ings (e.g., Hurlemann et al., 2010), social feedback in the form
of facial expressions, if compared to non-social feedback in the
form of conventional feedback marks, led people to be more
generous. Furthermore, both behavioral and modeling results
conﬁrmed that social reward in the form of facial expressions bias
decision-making,which is consistentwith previous behavioral and
modeling results focused on smiling facial expressions (Averbeck
and Duchaine, 2009; Shore and Heerey, 2011). Speciﬁcally, our
results extend the literature on the impact of subtle cues on social
behavior (e.g., Bargh and Williams, 2006) indicating that emo-
tional facial expression may bias behavior toward more generosity
through lowering one’s sensitivity to economic costs.
Angry facial expressions, in particular, might drive such a pat-
tern of learning and decision-making by affecting the motivation
to spend extra monetary units during a social interaction, thereby
displayingmore generous behavior. Angry facial expressionsmight
signal social disapproval of a failure to comply with a norm. Such
a failure might be due to a lack of knowledge of the social envi-
ronment. Thus, learners of a social norm might feel anxious and
uncomfortable in observing an angry reaction, which might in
turn lead them to behave more generously in an attempt to avoid
social disapproval in the future (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Haley
and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Rigdon et al., 2009). Inter-
estingly, the desire to avoid social disapproval is one of the main
factors that apparently motivate people to tip in restaurants in the
real world (Conlin et al., 2003; Azar, 2007).
Given the structure of the Tipping Game, and given that our
Rescorla–Wagner model nicely ﬁtted participants’ choices, it is
plausible that our task engaged a basic reinforcement learning
mechanism,which is responsible for several social behaviors (Frith
and Frith, 2012). According to reinforcement learning models
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), estimated value of states or actions
is updated through prediction error signals, whether about pri-
mary reward, money, or conventional or social choice feedback.
These error signals have been found to accurately predict neural
responses in the mesostriatal dopaminergic system and its targets
(Montague et al., 1996; Niv, 2009; Colombo, 2014). Some ﬁndings
suggest that both social and non-social reward are processed by the
same striatal neural systems (Lin et al., 2012a), while other studies
emphasize the speciﬁc role of mentalizing networks, associated
with the temporoparietal junction, in processing social reward
(e.g., Evans et al., 2011). In light of these results, one question
for further research is whether a domain general, dopamine-based
reinforcement learning mechanism can be sufﬁcient for the acqui-
sition of social norms (Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Examining results
from the Tipping Game task using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) can be one way to make progress on that
question.
Three limitations of our study should be singled out. First,
some neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism, Asperger
syndrome and schizophrenia, are known to affect the relative
power of social vs. non-social feedback (cf., Montague et al.,
2012). Furthermore, previous experiments suggest that males and
females process some types of social reward differently (Spreck-
elmeyer et al., 2009). While we measured some scores relevant to
assess autistic traits in Experiment 1, we did not collect them
in Experiment 2, and we did not measure other personality
traits potentially relevant to social decision-making and learn-
ing. Based on the scores that we did collect, and based on
analyses of gender differences, the hypotheses that the behav-
ioral effects we found could be explained solely by a gender
difference or by some autistic trait in our participants could be
ruled out. However, the issues remain to what extent gender dif-
ferences in reward processing are associated with differences in
social learning and decision-making, and how the social dys-
functions observed in people with certain neurodevelopmental
disorders is linked to a speciﬁc deﬁcit in the processing of social
feedback.
Second, one reason why our participants did not generally
perform well in the Tipping Game might be that its feed-
back structure made the learning task especially hard. Overall,
the level of noise in the mapping between state-action pairs
and reward outcomes was high across the blocks in our task,
making the feedback provided not very reliable. Moreover, the
reliability of the feedback was independent from the differ-
ence between amount tipped and underlying social norm, so
that tips well above the social norm could still receive nega-
tive feedback. In order to improve learning performance, the
feedback structure of the task may be modiﬁed in two ways.
On the one hand, the level of noise in the mapping between
state-action pairs and reward outcomes may be diminished
across all blocks, similarly to what we did in the fourth block
of Experiment 2. On the other hand, the reliability of the
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feedback provided may be made dependent on the distance
between amount tipped and underlying social norm, so as
to strengthen the reliability of feedback for tips well above
or well below the social norm. Although our main behav-
ioral results were robust to different levels of noise, it remains
a question for further research how exactly social decision-
making and learning are affected by the uncertainty of feedback
information.
The third limitation concerns the distinction between social
and emotional cues. The stimuli that we used in the social
condition of our task did not help us to determine whether
the behavioral effects we observed depended on social rather
than on only the emotional dimension of facial expressions.
Facial expressions convey both social and emotional information.
Besides communicating information about other agents, facial
expressions can often elicit emotional reactions in the observers
(Furl et al., 2012). In order to identify the role of emotional
cues alone, in contrast to facial expressions, on participants’
learning and social decision-making, a third condition for our
task may employ emotional, non-social reward. Further work
will aim at clarifying these issues, and the generality of our
ﬁndings.
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